

# Groups for DH Key Exchange

Consider multiplication modulo 23.

23 is a “safe prime” since  $23 = 2 \cdot 11 + 1$ , where 11 is a prime.

Consider the following cyclic group generated by 2:

Actually, all of 2, 4, 8, 16, 9, 18, 13, 3, 6, 12 are generators and each of them raised to the 11 will be equal to 1 modulo 23.

$2^0 \text{ mod } 23$	1
$2^1 \text{ mod } 23$	2
$2^2 \text{ mod } 23$	4
$2^3 \text{ mod } 23$	8
$2^4 \text{ mod } 23$	16
$2^5 \text{ mod } 23$	$32 \rightarrow 9$
$2^6 \text{ mod } 23$	18
$2^7 \text{ mod } 23$	$36 \rightarrow 13$
$2^8 \text{ mod } 23$	$26 \rightarrow 3$
$2^9 \text{ mod } 23$	6
$2^{10} \text{ mod } 23$	12
$2^{11} \text{ mod } 23$	$24 \rightarrow 1$



# Key Agreement

The key-exchange experiment  $KE^{eav}_{A,\Pi}(n)$ :

1. Two parties holding  $1^n$  execute protocol  $\Pi$ . This results in a transcript  $trans$  containing all the messages sent by the parties, and a key  $k$  output by each of the parties.
2. A uniform bit  $b \in \{0,1\}$  is chosen. If  $b = 0$  set  $\hat{k} := k$ , and if  $b = 1$  then choose  $\hat{k} \in \{0,1\}^n$  uniformly at random.
3.  $A$  is given  $trans$  and  $\hat{k}$ , and outputs a bit  $b'$ .
4. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if  $b' = b$  and 0 otherwise.

Definition: A key-exchange protocol  $\Pi$  is secure in the presence of an eavesdropper if for all ppt adversaries  $A$  there is a negligible function  $neg$  such that

$$\Pr \left[ KE^{eav}_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1 \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + neg(n).$$



# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange




FIGURE 10.2: The Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol.

# Example for the group we saw above with generator $g = 2$ :

Alice:

$x \leftarrow \{0, \dots, 10\}$   
Say  $x = 8$

$$2^8 \bmod 23 = 3$$


$$\begin{aligned} \text{Output: } & 9^8 \bmod 23 \\ &= 3^{16} \bmod 23 \\ &= 3^{11} \cdot 3^5 \bmod 23 \\ &= 1 \cdot 3^5 \bmod 23 \\ &= 27 \cdot 9 \bmod 23 \\ &= 4 \cdot 9 \bmod 23 \\ &= 36 \bmod 23 = \mathbf{13} \end{aligned}$$

Bob:


$y \leftarrow \{0, \dots, 10\}$   
Say  $y = 5$

$$2^5 \bmod 23 = 9$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Output: } & 3^5 \bmod 23 \\ &= 27 \cdot 9 \bmod 23 \\ &= 4 \cdot 9 \bmod 23 \\ &= 36 \bmod 23 = \mathbf{13} \end{aligned}$$



# CPA Security for PKE



Attacker “wins” if  $b' = b$ .

CPA Security: Any efficient attacker wins with probability at most  $\frac{1}{2} + \textit{negligible}$

# RSA Encryption

## *CONSTRUCTION 11.25*

Let GenRSA be as in the text. Define a public-key encryption scheme as follows:

- Gen: on input  $1^n$  run GenRSA( $1^n$ ) to obtain  $N, e$ , and  $d$ . The public key is  $\langle N, e \rangle$  and the private key is  $\langle N, d \rangle$ .
- Enc: on input a public key  $pk = \langle N, e \rangle$  and a message  $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ , compute the ciphertext

$$c := [m^e \bmod N].$$

- Dec: on input a private key  $sk = \langle N, d \rangle$  and a ciphertext  $c \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ , compute the message

$$m := [c^d \bmod N].$$

The plain RSA encryption scheme.





# RSA Example

$$p = 3, q = 7, N = 21$$

$$\phi(N) = 12$$

$$e = 5$$

$$d = 5$$

$$Enc_{(21,5)}(4) = 4^5 \text{ mod } 21 = 16 \text{ mod } 21$$

$$\begin{aligned} Dec_{21,5}(16) &= 16^5 \text{ mod } 21 = 4^5 \cdot 4^5 \text{ mod } 21 \\ &= 16 \cdot 16 \text{ mod } 21 = 4 \end{aligned}$$

# Is Plain-RSA Secure?

- It is deterministic so cannot be secure!
- There are also various additional attacks which we will not cover.

# Padded RSA

## *CONSTRUCTION 11.29*

Let GenRSA be as before, and let  $\ell$  be a function with  $\ell(n) \leq 2n - 4$  for all  $n$ . Define a public-key encryption scheme as follows:

- Gen: on input  $1^n$ , run GenRSA( $1^n$ ) to obtain  $(N, e, d)$ . Output the public key  $pk = \langle N, e \rangle$ , and the private key  $sk = \langle N, d \rangle$ .
- Enc: on input a public key  $pk = \langle N, e \rangle$  and a message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^{\|N\| - \ell(n) - 2}$ , choose a random string  $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$  and interpret  $\hat{m} := 1\|r\|m$  as an element of  $\mathbb{Z}_N^*$ . Output the ciphertext

$$c := [\hat{m}^e \bmod N].$$

- Dec: on input a private key  $sk = \langle N, d \rangle$  and a ciphertext  $c \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ , compute

$$\hat{m} := [c^d \bmod N],$$

and output the  $\|N\| - \ell(n) - 2$  least-significant bits of  $\hat{m}$ .

The padded RSA encryption scheme.