

# Introduction to Cryptology

## Lecture 17

# Announcements

- HW7 due on 4/12
- Reminder to sign up for scholarly paper EC

# Agenda

- Last time:
  - Practical constructions of block ciphers (6.2)
    - Feistel, AES, DES
  - Please read (6.2.3) on your own on Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis
- This time:
  - Practical constructions of CRHF (6.3)
  - Number Theory (8.1)

# Details on AES

- In January 1997, the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a competition to select a new block cipher—to be called the Advanced Encryption Standard, or AES
- 15 submissions from all over the world. Each team's candidate cipher was intensively analyzed by members of NIST, the public, and (especially) the other teams. Two workshops were held ('98, '99) to analyze the various submissions. Following the second workshop, NIST narrowed the field down to 5 “finalists” and the second round of the competition began. A third AES workshop was held in April 2000, inviting additional scrutiny on the five finalists.
- In October 2000, NIST announced that the winning algorithm was Rijndael (a block cipher designed by Belgian cryptographers Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen)

# Details on AES

A 4-by-4 array of bytes called the **state** is modified in a series of rounds. The state is initialized to the input to the cipher (128 bits = 16 bytes). The following operations are then applied in each round:

1. Stage 1 – AddRoundKey: A 128-bit sub-key is derived from the master key, and is interpreted as a 4-by-4 array of bytes. **state** updated by XORing it with this sub-key.
2. Stage 2 – SubBytes: Each byte of **state** is replaced by another byte according to a single fixed lookup table  $S$ . This substitution table (or S-box) is a bijection over  $\{0, 1\}^8$ .
3. Stage 3 – ShiftRows: The bytes in each row of **state** are cyclically shifted to the left as follows: the first row of the array is untouched, the second row is shifted one place to the left, the third row is shifted two places to the left, and the fourth row is shifted three places to the left. All shifts are cyclic so that, e.g., in the second row the first byte becomes the fourth byte.
4. Stage 4 – MixColumns: An invertible transformation is applied to the four bytes in each column. (linear transformation—i.e., matrix multiplication—over an appropriate field.)

If two inputs differ in  $b > 0$  bytes, then transformation yields two outputs differing in at least  $5 - b$  bytes.

In the final round, MixColumns is replaced with AddRoundKey. Why?

- To date, no practical cryptanalytic attacks significantly better than a exhaustive search.

# Preliminaries

- How much security can we hope for from a CRHF that outputs  $\ell$  bits?
- Discuss the “**birthday bound**”
  - No matter what function is used, collisions can be found with high probability after making  $2^{\ell/2}$  queries.

# Hash Functions From Block Ciphers

- Hash functions are generally constructed in two steps:
  - First, a compression function (fixed-length hash function)  $h$  is designed
  - Next, some mechanism (e.g. Merkle-Damgard) is used to extend  $h$  so as to handle arbitrary input lengths
- We will focus on the first step

# Hash Functions From Block Ciphers

- Davies-Meyer construction:
  - $F$  is a block-cipher with  $n$ -bit key and  $\ell$ -bit block length.




FIGURE 6.10: The Davies-Meyer construction.

- Above forms a compression function from  $n + \ell$  bits to  $n$  bits.



# Security Analysis

- We do not know how to prove collision-resistance of the compression function based on the assumption that  $F$  is a strong PRP.
- Requires stronger assumption that  $F$  behaves like an **ideal cipher**.
  - Like a truly random permutation, except can query oracle on **different keys**.
  - Each key  $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$  specifies an independent, uniform permutation  $F(k, \cdot)$  on  $\ell$ -bit strings.

# Security Analysis

- Theorem: If  $F$  is modeled as an ideal cipher, then the Davies-Meyer construction yields a collision-resistant compression function. Concretely, any attacker making  $q < 2^{\ell/2}$  queries to its ideal-cipher oracles finds a collision with probability at most  $q^2/2^{\ell}$ .

# MD5

- 128-bit output length.
- Designed in 1991, and for several years was believed to be collision-resistant. Over a period of several years, various weaknesses began to be found in MD5 but
- these did not appear to lead to any easy way to find collisions.
- In 2004 a team of Chinese cryptanalysts presented a new method for finding
- collisions in MD5 and were able to demonstrate an explicit collision!
- Since then, the attack has been improved—collisions can be found in under a minute on a desktop PC—and extended so that even “controlled collisions” (e.g., two postscript files generating arbitrary viewable content) can be found.
- Due to these attacks, MD5 should no longer be used today for any application requiring cryptographic security.

# SHA-0, SHA-1, SHA-2

- The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) refers to a series of cryptographic hash functions standardized by NIST.
- SHA-1, was introduced in 1995. This algorithm has a 160-bit output length, and supplanted a predecessor called SHA-0 which was withdrawn due to unspecified flaws discovered in that algorithm.
- Theoretical analysis over the past few years indicates that collisions in SHA-1 can be found using significantly fewer than the 280 hash function evaluations that would be necessary using a birthday attack.
- Recently an explicit collision has been found.
- It is therefore recommended to migrate to SHA-2, which does not currently appear to have the same weaknesses.
- SHA-2 comprises two related functions: SHA-256 and SHA-512, with 256- and 512-bit output lengths, respectively.

# SHA-0, SHA-1, SHA-2

- All hash functions in the SHA family are constructed using the same basic design:
  - A compression function is first defined using the Davies-Meyer construction as applied to some block cipher
  - Extended to support arbitrary length inputs using the Merkle-Damgård transform.
- The block cipher in each case was designed specifically for building the compression function.
  - Block ciphers SHACAL-1 (for SHA-1) and SHACAL-2 (for SHA-2). Have large block lengths (160 and 256 bits respectively) and 512-bit key lengths.

# SHA-3 (Keccak)

- NIST announced in late 2007 a public competition to design a new cryptographic hash function to be called SHA-3.
- Submitted algorithms were required to support both 256- and 512-bit output lengths.
- 51 first-round candidates were narrowed down to 14 in December, 2008, and these were further reduced to five finalists in 2010. The remaining candidates were subject to intense scrutiny by the cryptographic community over the next two years.
- In October, 2012, NIST announced the selection of Keccak as the winner of the competition.
- This algorithm is currently undergoing standardization as the next-generation replacement for SHA-2.

# SHA-3 (Keccak)

- Keccak is unusual in several respects.
  - One of the reasons Keccak was chosen is because its structure is very different from that of SHA-1 and SHA-2.
- It is based on an **unkeyed** permutation  $f$  with a large block length of 1600 bits; this is radically different from, e.g., the Davies-Meyer construction which relies on a keyed permutation.
- Keccak does not use the Merkle-Damgard transform to handle arbitrary input lengths. Instead, it uses a newer approach called the **sponge** construction.
- Keccak—and the sponge construction more generally—can be analyzed in the random-permutation model
  - Here parties have access to an oracle for a random permutation  $f : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$  (and possibly its inverse).
  - This is weaker than the ideal-cipher model.

# Modular Arithmetic

Definition of modulo:

We say that two integers  $a, b$  are congruent modulo  $p$  denoted by

$$a \equiv b \pmod{p}$$

If

$$p \mid (a - b)$$

(i.e.  $p$  divides  $(a - b)$ ).



# Modular Arithmetic

Examples: All of the following are true

$$2 \equiv 15 \pmod{13}$$

$$28 \equiv 15 \pmod{13}$$

$$41 \equiv 15 \pmod{13}$$

$$-11 \equiv 15 \pmod{13}$$

# Modular Arithmetic

Operation: addition mod  $p$

Regular addition, take modulo  $p$ .

Example:  $8 + 10 \text{ mod } 13 \equiv 18 \text{ mod } 13 \equiv 5 \text{ mod } 13$ .

# Properties of Addition mod $p$

Consider the set  $Z_p$  of integers  $\{0, 1, \dots, p - 1\}$  and the operation addition mod  $p$ .

- Closure: Adding two numbers in  $Z_p$  and taking mod  $p$  yields a number in  $Z_p$ .
- Identity: For every  $a \in Z_p$ ,  $[0 + a] \bmod p \equiv a \bmod p$ .
- Inverse: For every  $a \in Z_p$ , there exists a  $b \in Z_p$  such that  $a + b \equiv 0 \bmod p$ .
  - $b$  is simply the negation of  $a$  ( $b = -a$ ).
  - Note that using the property of inverse, we can do subtraction. We define  $c - d \bmod p$  to be equivalent to  $c + (-d) \bmod p$ .
- Associativity: For every  $a, b, c \in Z_p$ :  
 $(a + b) + c = a + (b + c) \bmod p$ .

$Z_p$  is a group with respect to addition!

# Definition of a Group

A group is a set  $G$  along with a binary operation  $\circ$  for which the following conditions hold:

- Closure: For all  $g, h \in G$ ,  $g \circ h \in G$ .
- Identity: There exists an identity  $e \in G$  such that for all  $g \in G$ ,  $e \circ g = g = g \circ e$ .
- Inverse: For all  $g \in G$  there exists an element  $h \in G$  such that  $g \circ h = e = h \circ g$ . Such an  $h$  is called an inverse of  $g$ .
- Associativity: For all  $g_1, g_2, g_3 \in G$ ,  $(g_1 \circ g_2) \circ g_3 = g_1 \circ (g_2 \circ g_3)$ .

When  $G$  has a finite number of elements, we say  $G$  is finite and let  $|G|$  denote the order of the group.

# Abelian Group

A group  $G$  with operation  $\circ$  is abelian if the following holds:

- Commutativity: For all  $g, h \in G$ ,  $g \circ h = h \circ g$ .

We will always deal with finite, abelian groups.

# Other groups over the integers

- We will be interested mainly in multiplicative groups over the integers, since there are computational problems believed to be hard over such groups.
  - Such hard problems are the basis of number-theoretic cryptography.
- Group operation is multiplication mod  $p$ , instead of addition mod  $p$ .

# Multiplication mod $p$

Example:

$$3 \cdot 8 \text{ mod } 13 \equiv 24 \text{ mod } 13 \equiv 11 \text{ mod } 13.$$

# Multiplicative Groups

Is  $Z_p$  a group with respect to multiplication mod  $p$ ?

- Closure—YES
- Identity—YES (1 instead of 0)
- Associativity—YES
- Inverse—NO
  - 0 has no inverse since there is no integer  $a$  such that  $0 \cdot a \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ .





# Multiplicative Group

For  $p$  prime, define  $Z_p^* = \{1, \dots, p - 1\}$  with operation multiplication mod  $p$ .

We will see that  $Z_p^*$  is indeed a multiplicative group!

To prove that  $Z_p^*$  is a multiplicative group, it is sufficient to prove that every element has a multiplicative inverse (since we have already argued that all other properties of a group are satisfied).

This is highly non-trivial, we will see how to prove it using the Euclidean Algorithm.