Introduction to Cryptology

Lecture 10
Announcements

• HW4 due Tuesday, 3/6
• Extra Class Exercise and Solution on Course Webpage (on PRFs)
Agenda

• Last time:
  – CPA-secure encryption from PRF (K/L 3.5)

• This time:
  – PRP (Block Ciphers) (K/L 3.5)
  – Modes of operation (K/L 3.6)
  – New topic:
    • Message Authentication Codes (MAC) (K/L 4.2)
Block Ciphers/Pseudorandom Permutations

Definition: Pseudorandom Permutation is exactly the same as a Pseudorandom Function, except for every key \( k \), \( F_k \) must be a permutation and it must be indistinguishable from a random permutation.
Strong Pseudorandom Permutation

Definition: Let $F: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ be an efficient, length-preserving, keyed permutation. We say that $F$ is a strong pseudorandom permutation if for all ppt distinguishers $D$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}$ such that:

$$\left| \Pr[D^{F_{k(\cdot)},F^{-1}_k(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[D^{f(\cdot),f^{-1}(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(n).$$

where $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is chosen uniformly at random and $f$ is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all permutations mapping $n$-bit strings to $n$-bit strings.
Modes of Operation—Stream Cipher

If sender and receiver are willing to maintain state, can encrypt multiple messages.
Modes of Operation—Block Cipher

**FIGURE 3.5:** Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode.

**FIGURE 3.6:** An illustration of the dangers of using ECB mode. The middle figure is an encryption of the image on the left using ECB mode; the figure on the right is an encryption of the same image using a secure mode.

**FIGURE 3.7:** Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode.
Modes of Operation—Block Cipher

**FIGURE 3.9:** Output Feedback (OFB) mode.

**FIGURE 3.10:** Counter (CTR) mode.
Message Integrity

• Secrecy vs. Integrity

• Encryption vs. Message Authentication
Message Authentication Codes

Definition: A message authentication code (MAC) consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms \((Gen, Mac, Vrfy)\) such that:

1. The key-generation algorithm \(Gen\) takes as input the security parameter \(1^n\) and outputs a key \(k\) with \(|k| \geq n\).
2. The tag-generation algorithm \(Mac\) takes as input a key \(k\) and a message \(m \in \{0,1\}^*\), and outputs a tag \(t\).
   \[ t \leftarrow Mac_k(m). \]
3. The deterministic verification algorithm \(Vrfy\) takes as input a key \(k\), a message \(m\), and a tag \(t\). It outputs a bit \(b\) with \(b = 1\) meaning valid and \(b = 0\) meaning invalid.
   \[ b := Vrfy_k(m, t). \]

It is required that for every \(n\), every key \(k\) output by \(Gen(1^n)\), and every \(m \in \{0,1\}^*\), it holds that \(Vrfy_k(m, Mac_k(m)) = 1\).
Security of MACs

The message authentication experiment $MAC_{forge_{A,Π}}(n)$:

1. A key $k$ is generated by running $Gen(1^n)$.
2. The adversary $A$ is given input $1^n$ and oracle access to $Mac_k(\cdot)$. The adversary eventually outputs $(m, t)$. Let $Q$ denote the set of all queries that $A$ asked its oracle.
3. $A$ succeeds if and only if (1) $Vrfy_k(m, t) = 1$ and (2) $m \notin Q$. In that case, the output of the experiment is defined to be 1.
Security of MACs

Definition: A message authentication code \( \Pi = (Gen, Mac, Vrfy) \) is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries \( A \), there is a negligible function \( neg \) such that:

\[
\Pr[MACforge_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1] \leq neg(n).
\]