#### Introduction to Cryptology

Lecture 21

#### Announcements

- HW10 due on Thursday, 4/30
- HW 9 grades up on Canvas
- HW 7,8 solutions up on Canvas
- Dr. Feng-Hao Liu will be subbing next class

# Agenda

• Last time:

Number theory background (8.2)

- This time:
  - Number theory background
    - Hard problems in Cyclic Groups (8.3)
    - Elliptic Curve Groups (8.3)
  - Key Exchange definition and Diffie-Hellman KE (10.3)

# Recall: Cyclic Groups

For a finite group G of order m and  $g \in G$ , consider:

$$\langle g\rangle = \{g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{m-1}\}$$

 $\langle g \rangle$  always forms a cyclic subgroup of G.

However, it is possible that there are repeats in the above list.

Thus  $\langle g \rangle$  may be a subgroup of order smaller than m.

If  $\langle g \rangle = G$ , then we say that G is a cyclic group and that g is a generator of G.

# The Discrete Logarithm Problem

The discrete-log experiment  $DLog_{A,G}(n)$ 

- 1. Run  $G(1^n)$  to obtain (G, q, g) where G is a cyclic group of order q (with ||q|| = n) and g is a generator of G.
- 2. Choose a uniform  $h \in G$
- 3. A is given G, q, g, h and outputs  $x \in Z_q$
- 4. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if  $g^x = h$  and 0 otherwise.

Definition: We say that the DL problem is hard relative to G if for all ppt algorithms A there exists a negligible function neg such that

$$\Pr[DLog_{A,G}(n) = 1] \le neg(n).$$

#### The Diffie-Hellman Problems

#### The CDH Problem

Given (G, q, g) and uniform  $h_1 = g^{x_1}, h_2 = g^{x_2}$ , compute  $g^{x_1 \cdot x_2}$ .

### The DDH Problem

We say that the DDH problem is hard relative to G if for all ppt algorithms A, there exists a negligible function neg such that

$$|\Pr[A(G, q, g, g^{x}, g^{y}, g^{z}) = 1] - \Pr[A(G, q, g, g^{x}, g^{y}, g^{xy}) = 1]| \le neg(n).$$

#### **Relative Hardness of the Assumptions**

Breaking DLog  $\rightarrow$  Breaking CDH  $\rightarrow$  Breaking DDH

DDH Assumption  $\rightarrow$  CDH Assumption  $\rightarrow$  DLog Assumption

Why use them?

- No known sub-exponential time algorithm for solving DL in appropriate Curves.
- Implementation will be more efficient.

- $Z_p$  is a finite field for prime p.
- Let  $p \ge 5$  be a prime
- Consider equation *E* in variables *x*, *y* of the form:

$$y^2 \coloneqq x^3 + Ax + B \mod p$$

Where A, B are constants such that  $4A^3 + 27B^2 \neq 0$ . (this ensures that  $x^3 + Ax + B \mod p$  has no repeated roots). Let  $E(Z_p)$  denote the set of pairs  $(x, y) \in Z_p \times Z_p$  satisfying the above equation as well as a special value O.

$$E(Z_p) \coloneqq \{(x, y) | x, y \in Z_p \text{ and } y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B \text{ mod } p\} \cup \{0\}$$

The elements  $E(Z_p)$  are called the points on the Elliptic Curve E and O is called the point at infinity.

Example:

Quadratic Residues over  $Z_7$ .

$$0^2 = 0, 1^2 = 1, 2^2 = 4, 3^2 = 9 = 2, 4^2 = 16 = 2, 5^2$$
  
= 25 = 4, 6<sup>2</sup> = 36 = 1.

 $f(x) \coloneqq x^3 + 3x + 3$  and curve  $E: y^2 = f(x) \mod 7$ .

- Each value of x for which f(x) is a non-zero quadratic residue mod 7 yields 2 points on the curve
- Values of x for which f(x) is a non-quadratic residue are not on the curve.
- Values of x for which  $f(x) \equiv 0 \mod 7$  give one point on the curve.

$f(0) \equiv 3 \bmod 7$	a quadratic non-residue mod 7
$f(1) \equiv 0 \bmod 7$	so we obtain the point $(1,0) \in E(Z_7)$
$f(2) \equiv 3 \bmod 7$	a quadratic non-residue mod 7
$f(3) \equiv 4 \bmod 7$	a quadratic residue with roots 2,5. so we obtain the points $(3,2), (3,5) \in E(Z_7)$
$f(4) \equiv 2 \bmod 7$	a quadratic residue with roots 3,4. so we obtain the points $(4,3), (4,4) \in E(Z_7)$
$f(5) \equiv 3 \bmod 7$	a quadratic non-residue mod 7
$f(6) \equiv 6 \bmod 7$	a quadratic non-residue mod 7




FIGURE 8.2: An elliptic curve over the reals.

# Point at infinity: *O* sits at the top of the *y*-axis and lies on every vertical line.

Every line intersecting  $E(Z_p)$  intersects it in exactly 3 points:

1. A point *P* is counted 2 times if line is tangent to the curve at *P*.

2. The point at infinity is also counted when the line is vertical.

# Addition over Elliptic Curves

Binary operation "addition" denoted by + on points of  $E(Z_p)$ .

- The point *O* is defined to be an additive identity for all  $P \in E(Z_p)$  we define P + O = O + P = P.
- For 2 points  $P_1, P_2 \neq 0$  on E, we evaluate their sum  $P_1 + P_2$  by drawing the line through  $P_1, P_2$  (If  $P_1 = P_2$ , draw the line tangent to the curve at  $P_1$ ) and finding the 3<sup>rd</sup> point of intersection  $P_3$  of this line with  $E(Z_p)$ .
- The 3<sup>rd</sup> point may be  $P_3 = O$  if the line is vertical.
- If  $P_3 = (x, y) \neq 0$  then we define  $P_1 + P_2 = (x, -y)$ .
- If  $P_3 = O$  then we define  $P_1 + P_2 = O$ .

#### Additive Inverse over Elliptic Curves

- If  $P = (x, y) \neq 0$  is a point of  $E(Z_p)$  then -P = (x, -y) which is clearly also a point on  $E(Z_p)$ .
- The line through (x, y), (x, -y) is vertical and so addition implies that P + (-P) = 0.
- Additionally, -0 = 0.

#### Groups over Elliptic Curves

Proposition: Let  $p \ge 5$  be prime and let *E* be the elliptic curve given by  $y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B \mod p$  where  $4A^3 + 27B^2 \ne 0 \mod p$ .

Let  $P_1, P_2 \neq 0$  be points on E with  $P_1 = (x_1, y_1)$  and  $P_2 = (x_2, y_2)$ .

1. If 
$$x_1 \neq x_2$$
 then  $P_1 + P_2 = (x_3, y_3)$  with  
 $x_3 = [m^2 - x_1 - x_2 \mod p], y_3 = [m - (x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \mod p]$   
Where  $m = \left[\frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \mod p\right]$ .  
2. If  $x_1 = x_2$  but  $y_1 \neq y_2$  then  $P_1 = -P_2$  and so  $P_1 + P_2 = 0$ .  
3. If  $P_1 = P_2$  and  $y_1 = 0$  then  $P_1 + P_2 = 2P_1 = 0$ .  
4. If  $P_1 = P_2$  and  $y_1 \neq 0$  then  $P_1 + P_2 = 2P_1 = (x_3, y_3)$  with  
 $x_3 = [m^2 - 2x_1 \mod p], y_3 = [m - (x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \mod p]$   
Where  $m = \left[\frac{3x_1^2 + A}{2y_1} \mod p\right]$ .

The set  $E(Z_p)$  along with the addition rule form an abelian group. The elliptic curve group of E.

\*\*Difficult property to verify is associativity. Can check through tedious calculation.

#### **DDH over Elliptic Curves**

DDH: Distinguish (*aP*, *bP*, *abP*) from (*aP*, *bP*, *cP*).

# Size of Elliptic Curve Groups?

How large are EC groups mod p?

Heuristic:  $y^2 = f(x)$  has 2 solutions whenever f(x) is a quadratic residue and 1 solution when f(x) = 0.

Since half the elements of  $Z_p^*$  are quadratic residues, expect  $\frac{2(p-1)}{2} + 1 = p$  points on curve. Including O, this gives p + 1 points.

Theorem (Hasse bound): Let p be prime, and let E be an elliptic curve over  $Z_p$ . Then

$$p+1-2\sqrt{p} \le |E(Z_p)| \le p+1+2\sqrt{p}.$$

#### Applications

# Key Agreement

The key-exchange experiment  $KE^{eav}_{A,\Pi}(n)$ :

- 1. Two parties holding  $1^n$  execute protocol  $\Pi$ . This results in a transcript *trans* containing all the messages sent by the parties, and a key k output by each of the parties.
- 2. A uniform bit  $b \in \{0,1\}$  is chosen. If b = 0 set  $\hat{k} \coloneqq k$ , and if b = 1 then choose  $\hat{k} \in \{0,1\}^n$  uniformly at random.
- 3. A is given *trans* and  $\hat{k}$ , and outputs a bit b'.
- 4. The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b' = b and 0 otherwise.

Definition: A key-exchange protocol  $\Pi$  is secure in the presence of an eavesdropper if for all ppt adversaries A there is a negligible function neg such that

$$\Pr\left[KE^{eav}_{A,\Pi}(n)=1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + neg(n).$$

### **Discussion of Definition**

- Why is this the "right" definition?
- Why does the adversary get to see  $\hat{k}$ ?