

Solutions

Cryptography--ENEE/CMSC/MATH 456

MAC Class Exercise

Let F be a length-preserving pseudorandom function. Show that each of the following message authentication codes is insecure. (In each case the shared key is a random $k \in \{0,1\}^n$.)

*****Challenge:** In (1), show how to create a forgery after seeing a single, random message tag pair $(m_1 || m_2), (t_1 || t_2)$.

1. To authenticate a message $m = m_1 || m_2$, where $m_1, m_2 \in \{0,1\}^n$, compute $t := F_k(m_1) || F_k(m_2 \oplus F_k(m_1))$.

Attack: query for a signature on m_1, m_2
get back $t := t_1 || t_2$ where $t_1 = F_k(m_1)$ $t_2 = F_k(m_2 \oplus F_k(m_1))$
query for a signature on m_1', m_2'
get back $t' := t'_1 || t'_2$ where $t'_1 = F_k(m_1')$ $t'_2 = F_k(m_2' \oplus F_k(m_1'))$

Forge a signature on m_1'', m_2''
where $m_1'' := m_1$ $m_2'' := t_1 \oplus m_1' = F_k(m_1) \oplus m_1'$
tag $t'' := t_1 || t'_1$

2. To authenticate a message $m = m_1 || \dots || m_\ell$, where $m_i \in \{0,1\}^n$, choose $r \in \{0,1\}^n$ at random and compute $t := r || F_k(m_1 \oplus r) || \dots || F_k(m_\ell \oplus r)$.

Attack: query for a signature on $m = m_1 || \dots || m_\ell$
get back $t := r || t_1 || \dots || t_\ell$

Forge a signature on $m_1 \oplus r || \dots || m_\ell \oplus r$
by outputting tag
 $t' := 0 || t_1 || \dots || t_\ell$.