

Cryptography

Lecture 7

Announcements

- HW2 due Monday, 2/26


Agenda

- Last time:
 - Stream Ciphers
 - CPA Security (K/L 3.4)
- This time:
 - Pseudorandom Functions (PRF) (K/L 3.5)
 - CPA-secure encryption from PRF (K/L 3.5)
 - PRP (Block Ciphers) (K/L 3.5)
 - Modes of operation (K/L 3.6)

Pseudorandom Function

Definition: A keyed function $F: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ is a two-input function, where the first input is called the key and denoted k .

Pseudorandom Function (PRF)



PRF: Any efficient A cannot tell which world it is in.

$$|\Pr[A^f() = 1] - \Pr[A^{F_k}() = 1]| \leq \textit{negligible}$$


Pseudorandom Function

Definition: Let $F: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ be an efficient, length-preserving, keyed function. We say that F is a pseudorandom function if for all ppt distinguishers D , there exists a negligible function $negl$ such that:

$$\left| \Pr[D^{F_k(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[D^{f(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] \right| \leq negl(n).$$

where $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is chosen uniformly at random and f is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all functions mapping n -bit strings to n -bit strings.

Construction of CPA-Secure Encryption from PRF



Formal Description of Construction

Let F be a pseudorandom function. Define a private-key encryption scheme for messages of length n as follows:

- *Gen*: on input 1^n , choose $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ uniformly at random and output it as the key.
- *Enc*: on input a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^n$, choose $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ uniformly at random and output the ciphertext

$$c := \langle r, F_k(r) \oplus m \rangle.$$

- *Dec*: on input a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ and a ciphertext $c = \langle r, s \rangle$, output the plaintext message

$$m := F_k(r) \oplus s.$$

Security Analysis

Theorem: If F is a pseudorandom function, then the Construction above is a CPA-secure private-key encryption scheme for messages of length n .


Recall: CPA Security

Consider a private-key encryption scheme $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$, any adversary A , and any value n for the security parameter.

Experiment $PrivK_{A,\Pi}^{cpa}(n)$

Adversary $A(1^n)$

Challenger



$PrivK_{A,\Pi}^{cpa}(n) = 1$ if $b' = b$ and $PrivK_{A,\Pi}^{cpa}(n) = 0$ if $b' \neq b$.

Recall: CPA-Security

Definition: A private-key encryption scheme $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$ has indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen-plaintext attack if for all ppt adversaries A there exists a negligible function $negl$ such that

$$\Pr \left[PrivK^{cpa}_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1 \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + negl(n),$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins used by A , as well as the random coins used in the experiment.

Pseudorandom Function

Definition: Let $F: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^*$ be an efficient, length-preserving, keyed function. We say that F is a pseudorandom function if for all ppt distinguishers D , there exists a negligible function $negl$ such that:

$$\left| \Pr[D^{F_k(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[D^{f(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] \right| \leq negl(n).$$

where $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is chosen uniformly at random and f is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all functions mapping n -bit strings to n -bit strings.

Security Analysis

Let A be a ppt adversary trying to break the security of the construction. We construct a distinguisher D that uses A as a subroutine to break the security of the PRF.

Distinguisher D :

D gets oracle access to oracle O , which is either F_k , where F is pseudorandom or f which is truly random.

1. Instantiate $A^{Enc_k(\cdot)}(1^n)$.
2. When A queries its oracle, with message m , choose r at random, query $O(r)$ to obtain z and output $c := \langle r, z \oplus m \rangle$.
3. Eventually, A outputs $m_0, m_1 \in \{0,1\}^n$.
4. Choose a uniform bit $b \in \{0,1\}$. Choose r at random, query $O(r)$ to obtain z and output $c := \langle r, z \oplus m \rangle$.
5. Give c to A and obtain output b' . Output **1** if $b' = b$, and output **0** otherwise.

Security Analysis

Consider the probability D outputs 1 in the case that O is truly random function f vs. O is a pseudorandom function F_k .

- When O is pseudorandom, D outputs 1 with probability $\Pr \left[\text{PrivK}^{cpa}_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1 \right] = \frac{1}{2} + \rho(n)$, where ρ is non-negligible.
- When O is random, D outputs 1 with probability at most $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{q(n)}{2^n}$, where $q(n)$ is the number of oracle queries made by A . Why?

Security Analysis

D 's distinguishing probability is:

$$\left| \frac{1}{2} + \frac{q(n)}{2^n} - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \rho(n) \right) \right| = \rho(n) - \frac{q(n)}{2^n}.$$

Since, $\frac{q(n)}{2^n}$ is negligible and $\rho(n)$ is non-negligible, $\rho(n) - \frac{q(n)}{2^n}$ is non-negligible.

This is a contradiction to the security of the PRF.