

Let  $G$  be a pseudorandom generator where  $|G(s)| = |s| + 1$

1. Define  $G'(s) = G(s||\bar{s})$ , where  $\bar{s}$  is the bit-wise negation of  $s$ . Is  $G'$  necessarily a pseudorandom generator? No.

Let  $G^*$  be a PRG from inputs of length  $n$  to length  $2n+1$   
 Define  $G$  in terms of  $G^*$  as follows:  $G(s=s_1||s_2) := G^*(s_1 \oplus s_2)$   
 $G$  is a PRG from  $n$  to  $n+1$ .  $G$  is secure b/c  $s_1 \oplus s_2$  is unif. dist.  
 Note  $G'(s) = G(s||\bar{s}) = G^*(s \oplus \bar{s}) = G^*(1^n) = \text{constant}$ .

Distinguisher for  $G'$ :

$D(w)$ :  
 if  $w = G^*(1^n)$  output 1  
 Else output 0

Need to show  $|\Pr[D(r)=1] - \Pr[D(G'(s))=1]|$  is high.

2. Define  $G'(s) = G(s)||G(\bar{s})$ , where  $\bar{s}$  is the bit-wise negation of  $s$ . Is  $G'$  necessarily a pseudorandom generator? No.

Let  $G^*$  be a PRG from inputs of length  $n$  to  $n+2$ .  
 Define  $G$  in terms of  $G^*$  as follows.

$G(s=s_1||s')$ : [where  $s_1$  is a single bit] }  $G$  is PRG from  $n$  to  $n+1$ .  
 if  $s_1 = 0$ , output  $G^*(s')$  }  $G$  is secure b/c  $s', \bar{s}'$  unif. dist.  
 if  $s_1 = 1$ , output  $G^*(\bar{s}')$

Note  $G'(s, s') = G(s, s') || G(\bar{s}, \bar{s}') = G^*(s) || G^*(s)$

Distinguisher checks if 1st and 2nd half of  $w$  are the same. } Need to show  $|\Pr[D(r)=1] - \Pr[D(G'(s))=1]|$  is high

3. Define  $G'(s) = G(s)_1 || G(G(s)_2, \dots, G(s)_{|s|+1})$ , where  $G(s)_i$  denotes the  $i$ -th output bit of  $G(s)$ . Is  $G'$  necessarily a pseudorandom generator? Yes.

Use a hybrid argument. Consider 3 distributions  $H_0, H_1, H_2$   
 In order to prove  $G'(s)$  is a PRG, need to show distinguisher cannot dist.  $H_0, H_2$

$H_0: G(s)_1 || G(G(s)_2, \dots, G(s)_{|s|+1})$  where  $s \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}^n$  } Indistinguishable due to security of PRG  $G$ .

$H_1: r_1 || G(r_2, \dots, r_{|s|+1})$  where  $r \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}^{n+1}$

$H_2: r_1 || r'_1, \dots, r'_{n+1}$  where  $r_1 \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}, r' \leftarrow_R \{0,1\}^{n+1}$  } Indistinguishable due to security of PRG  $G$ .

Note  $G'$  has stretch 2. Takes inputs of length  $n$ , produces outputs of length  $n+2$ .