Cryptography ENEE/CMSC/MATH 456: Homework 1

Due by beginning of class on 2/7/2024.

1. In this exercise, we look at different conditions under which the shift, mono-alphabetic substitution, and Vigenere ciphers are perfectly secret.
   (a) Prove that if only a single character is encrypted, then the shift cipher is perfectly secret.
   (b) What is the largest message space $\mathcal{M}$ for which the mono-alphabetic substitution cipher provides perfect secrecy?
   (c) Prove that the Vigenere cipher using (fixed) period t is perfectly secret when used to encrypt messages of length t.

2. Let $\mathcal{E} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ over message space $\mathcal{M}$ with keyspace $\mathcal{K}$ and ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$ be an encryption scheme that achieves perfect secrecy. Let $\mathcal{M}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}_2 = \mathcal{M} \setminus \mathcal{M}_1$ be two subsets of $\mathcal{M}$ such that $|\mathcal{M}_1| \geq 1, |\mathcal{M}_2| \geq 1$. Furthermore, let $\mathcal{D}_1$ be the uniform distribution over $\mathcal{M}_1$, $\mathcal{D}_2$ be the uniform distribution over $\mathcal{M}_2$.
   Finally, let C_1 (resp. C_2) be the random variable corresponding to the distribution over ciphertexts when messages are sampled from $\mathcal{D}_1$ (resp. $\mathcal{D}_2$) and keys are sampled by Gen.

   Is it possible that there is a ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $\Pr[C_1 = c] = 0$ and $\Pr[C_2 = c] > 0$? If yes, give an example of a specific encryption scheme that is perfectly secret and for which the above holds. If not, prove that for any encryption scheme that is perfectly secret, the above cannot hold.

3. Assume we require only that an encryption scheme $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ with message space $\mathcal{M}$ satisfy the following: For all $m \in \mathcal{M}$, we have $\Pr[\mathsf{Dec}_K(\mathsf{Enc}_K(m)) = m] \geq 2^{-t}$. (This probability is taken over choice of the key as well as any randomness used during encryption/decryption.) Show that perfect secrecy can be achieved with $|\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$ when $t \geq 1$. Prove a lower bound on the size of $\mathcal{K}$ in terms of t.
   Hint: How would the proof of Theorem 2.11 change if decryption only returns the correct answer with probability 2^{-t}?

4. In this problem we consider definitions of perfect secrecy for the encryption of two messages (using the same key). Here we consider distributions over pairs of messages from the message space $\mathcal{M}$; we let M_1, M_2 be random variables denoting the first and second message, respectively. We generate a (single) key k, sample messages (m_1, m_2) according to the given distribution, and then compute ciphertexts $c_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_k(m_1)$ and $c_2 \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_k(m_2)$; this induces a distribution over pairs of ciphertexts and we let C_1, C_2 be the corresponding random variables.

   (a) Say encryption scheme $(\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is perfectly secret for two messages if for all distributions over $\mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{M}$, all $m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M}$, and all ciphertexts $c_1, c_2 \in \mathcal{C}$ with $\Pr[C_1 = c_1 \wedge C_2 = c_2] > 0$: $\Pr[M_1 = m_1 \wedge M_2 = m_2 | C1 = c_1 \wedge C_2 = c_2] = \Pr[M_1 = m_1 \wedge M_2 = m_2]$. Prove that no encryption scheme can satisfy this definition.
   Hint: Take $m_1 \neq m_2$ but $c_1 = c_2$.

(b) Say encryption scheme $\mathcal{E} = (\mathsf{Gen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is perfectly secret for two distinct messages if for all distributions over $\mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{M}$ where the first and second messages are guaranteed to be different (i.e., distributions over pairs of distinct messages), all $m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M}$, and all $c_1, c_2 \in \mathcal{C}$ with $\Pr[C_1 = c_1 \wedge C_2 = c_2] > 0$: $\Pr[M_1 = m_1 \wedge M_2 = m_2 | C1 = c_1 \wedge C_2 = c_2] = \Pr[M_1 = m_1 \wedge M_2 = m_2]$. Show an encryption scheme that provably satisfies this definition. Hint: The encryption scheme you propose need not be efficient, though an efficient solution is possible.

5. When using the one-time pad with the key $k = 0^\ell$, we have $\mathsf{Enc}_k(m) = k \oplus m = m$ and the message is sent in the clear! It has therefore been suggested to modify the one-time pad by only encrypting with $k \neq 0^\ell$ (i.e., to have Gen choose k uniformly at random from the set of non-zero keys of length ℓ). Is this modified scheme still perfectly secret? Explain.

6. For each of the following encryption schemes, state whether the scheme achieves perfect secrecy. Justify your answer using Definition 2.3, Lemma 2.4, Theorem 2.10 and/or Theorem 2.11.
   - Message space $\mathcal{M} = \{1, \ldots, 6\}$. Key space $\mathcal{K} = \{1, ..., 6\}$. $\mathsf{Gen}()$ chooses a key k at random from $\mathcal{K}$. Let k' be such that $k \cdot k' \equiv 1 \mod 7$ (e.g. for $k = 5$, we have $k' = 3$ since $(5 \cdot 3) \mod 7 \equiv (15) \mod 7 = 1 \mod 7$). $\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)$ returns $m \cdot k \mod 7$. $\mathsf{Dec}_k(c)$ returns $c \cdot k' \mod 7$.

   - What happens when we use the same scheme as above except with $\mathcal{M} = \{1, \ldots, 8\}$ and $\mathcal{K} = \{1, \ldots, 8\}$? I.e. $\mathsf{Gen}()$ chooses a key k at random from $\mathcal{K}$ and $\mathsf{Enc}_k(m)$ returns $m \cdot k \mod 9$.

7. Write a program that increments a counter $2^{24}, 2^{25}, 2^{26}, \ldots, 2^{33}$ times, and measure how many seconds your program takes to run in each case. Estimate how many years your program would take to increment a counter 2^{64} or 2^{128} times. Based on your findings, what do you think would be a reasonably setting for the security parameter k of a cryptosystem which is assumed to be secure against attackers running in time $2^{\sqrt{k}}$?

8. The best algorithm known today for finding the prime factors of an n-bit number runs in time $2^{c \cdot n^{\frac{1}{3}} (\log n)^{\frac{2}{3}}}$. Assuming 4Ghz computers and $c = 1$ (and that the units of the given expression are clock cycles), estimate the size of numbers that cannot be factored for the next 100 years. You may assume that the log in the above formula is log base 2.

9. Prove the equivalence of Definition 3.8 and Definition 3.9.

10. Let G be a pseudorandom generator that on security paramter $n > 1$, takes as input bitstrings of length n and has expansion factor $\ell(n) > 2n$. In each of the following cases, say whether G' is necessarily a pseudorandom generator. If yes, give a proof; if not, show a counterexample.
    (a) Define $G'(s) = G(s_1, \ldots, s_{\lceil n/2 \rceil})$, where $s = s_1, \ldots, s_n$.
    (b) Define $G'(s) = G(0^{|s|} || s)$.

(c) Define $G'(s) = G(\mathsf{rotate}(s, 1))$, where $\mathsf{rotate}(s, 1)$ rotates the bits of s to the right by one position.