Cryptography

Lecture 8

Announcements

- HW3 due Wednesday, 2/22
- Additional instructions for NIST statistical tests are up on the course webpage.

Agenda

- Last time:
  - Stream Ciphers
  - CPA Security (K/L 3.4)
- This time:
  - Pseudorandom Functions (PRF) (K/L 3.5)
  - CPA-secure encryption from PRF (K/L 3.5)
  - PRP (Block Ciphers) (K/L 3.5)
  - Modes of operation (K/L 3.6)

Pseudorandom Function

Definition: A keyed function $F: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ is a two-input function, where the first input is called the key and denoted k.

Pseudorandom Function (PRF)



f is chosen at random from all functions from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$

k is chosen at random from $\{0,1\}^n$. F_k is the pseudorandom function indexed by k.

PRF: Any efficient A cannot tell which world it is in.

$$\left|\Pr[A^{f}(\,)=1]-\Pr[A^{F_k}(\,)=1]\right| \leq negligible$$

Pseudorandom Function

Definition: Let $F: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ be an efficient, length-preserving, keyed function. We say that F is a pseudorandom function if for all ppt distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function $negl$ such that:

$$\left|\Pr\left[D^{F_k(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[D^{f(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1\right]\right| \leq negl(n).$$

where $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is chosen uniformly at random and f is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.

Construction of CPA-Secure Encryption from PRF

$Gen(1^n)$: choose random $k \in \{0,1\}^n$

$Enc(k, m)$:

$r \in \{0,1\}^n$

$F_k(r)$

$||$

y

$Dec(k, (c, r))$



$c \oplus y = m.$

Formal Description of Construction

Let F be a pseudorandom function. Define a private-key encryption scheme for messages of length n as follows:

- Gen: on input 1^n, choose $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ uniformly at random and output it as the key.
- Enc: on input a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ and a message $m \in \{0,1\}^n$, choose $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ uniformly at random and output the ciphertext

$$c := \langle r, F_k(r) \oplus m \rangle.$$

- Dec: on input a key $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ and a ciphertext $c = \langle r, s \rangle$, output the plaintext message

$$m := F_k(r) \oplus s.$$

Security Analysis

Theorem: If F is a pseudorandom function, then the Construction above is a CPA-secure private-key encryption scheme for messages of length n.

Proof Approach: Assume adv A breaking enc scheme Π with $\Pr[\text{PrivK}^{cpa}_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$

Use A to build a distinguisher D against the prf game

$$\left| \Pr[D^{f(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[D^{F_k(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] \right| \geq \text{negl}'(n)$$

diff non-negl func.

Recall: CPA Security

Consider a private-key encryption scheme $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$, any adversary A, and any value n for the security parameter.

Experiment $PrivK^{cpa}_{A,\Pi}(n)$



$PrivK^{cpa}_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1$ if $b' = b$ and $PrivK^{cpa}_{A,\Pi}(n) = 0$ if $b' \neq b$.

Recall: CPA-Security

Definition: A private-key encryption scheme $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$ has indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen-plaintext attack if for all ppt adversaries A there exists a negligible function $negl$ such that

$$\Pr\left[PrivK^{cpa}_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + negl(n),$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins used by A, as well as the random coins used in the experiment.

Pseudorandom Function

Definition: Let $F: \{0,1\}^* \times \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*$ be an efficient, length-preserving, keyed function. We say that F is a pseudorandom function if for all ppt distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function $negl$ such that:

$$\left|\Pr\left[D^{F_k(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[D^{f(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1\right]\right| \leq negl(n).$$

where $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$ is chosen uniformly at random and f is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.



Specify D:

(1) How to respond to CPA queries

(a) choose $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$

(b) get $O(r)$ from oracle

(c) output $c' = O(r) \oplus m'$

(2) How to generate challenge ciphertext

(a) $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$ (b) choose $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$

(c) get $O(r)$ from oracle

(d) output $c = O(r) \oplus m_b$.

(3) How to answer 0/1 to its own oracle given b'.

Check $b \stackrel{?}{=} b'$

if yes, output 1 o/w output 0.

Analyze:

$$\Pr\left[D^{F_K(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1\right] = \Pr\left[\mathrm{PrivK}^{cpa}_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1\right]$$

key assumption

$$\geq \frac{1}{2} + \rho(n), \quad \rho \text{ is non-negl.}$$

$$\Pr\left[D^{f(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \Pr[\text{BadEvent}]$$

randomness in chall phase equal to rand. in CPA query phase.

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{q(n)}{2^n}$$

$q(n)$ ← # of queries made by CPA A

$$= \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$$

Abs. value of diff: $\rho(n) - \text{negl}(n) = \rho'(n) = \text{non-negl}$ ✓

Security Analysis

Let A be a ppt adversary trying to break the security of the construction. We construct a distinguisher D that uses A as a subroutine to break the security of the PRF.

Distinguisher D:

D gets oracle access to oracle O, which is either F_k, where F is pseudorandom or f which is truly random.

1. Instantiate $A^{Enc_k(\cdot)}(1^n)$.
2. When A queries its oracle, with message m, choose r at random, query $O(r)$ to obtain z and output c $:= \langle r, z \oplus m \rangle$.
3. Eventually, A outputs $m_0, m_1 \in \{0,1\}^n$.
4. Choose a uniform bit $b \in \{0,1\}$. Choose r at random, query $O(r)$ to obtain z and output c $:= \langle r, z \oplus m \rangle$.
5. Give c to A and obtain output b'. Output 1 if $b' = b$, and output 0 otherwise.

= Proof by contradiction

Security Analysis

Consider the probability D outputs 1 in the case that O is truly random function f vs. O is a pseudorandom function F_k.

- When O is pseudorandom, D outputs 1 with probability $\Pr\left[PrivK^{cpa}_{A,\Pi}(n) = 1\right] = \frac{1}{2} + \rho(n)$, where ρ is non-negligible.
- When O is random, D outputs 1 with probability at most $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{q(n)}{2^n}$, where $q(n)$ is the number of oracle queries made by A. Why?

Security Analysis

D's distinguishing probability is:

$$\left|\frac{1}{2}+\frac{q(n)}{2^n}-\left(\frac{1}{2}+\rho(n)\right)\right| = \rho(n) - \frac{q(n)}{2^n}.$$

Since, $\frac{q(n)}{2^n}$ is negligible and $\rho(n)$ is non-negligible, $\rho(n) - \frac{q(n)}{2^n}$ is non-negligible.

This is a contradiction to the security of the PRF.