#### Cryptography

Lecture 2

#### Announcements


- HW1 due on Wed, 2/8 at beginning of class
- Discrete Math Readings/Quizzes on Canvas due on Friday, 2/10 at 11:59pm

## Agenda

- Last time:
  - Historical ciphers and their cryptanalysis (K/L 1.3)
- This time:
  - More cryptanalysis (K/L 1.3)
  - Discussion on defining security
  - Basic terminology
  - Formal definition of symmetric key encryption (K/L 2.1)
  - Information-theoretic security (K/L 2.1)


#### Shift Cipher

For 0 ≤ i ≤ 25, the *i*th plaintext character is shifted by some value 0 ≤ k ≤ 25 (mod 26).
– E.g. k = 3



#### **Frequency Analysis**

If plaintext is known to be grammatically correct English, can use frequency analysis to break monoalphabetic substitution ciphers:



## An Improved Attack on Shift/Caesar Cipher using Frequency Analysis


- Associate letters of English alphabet with numbers 0...25
- Let p<sub>i</sub> denote the probability of the *i*-th letter in English text.
- Using the frequency table:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{25} p_i^2 \approx 0.065$$

- Let *q<sub>i</sub>* denote the probability of the *i*-th letter in this ciphertext: # of occurrences/length of ciphertext
- Compute  $I_j = \sum_{i=0}^{25} p_i \cdot q_{i+j}$  for each possible shift value j
- Output the value k for which  $I_k$  is closest to 0.065.

# Vigenere Cipher (1500 A.D.)

- Poly-alphabetic shift cipher: Maps the same plaintext character to different ciphertext characters.
- Vigenere Cipher applies multiple shift ciphers in sequence.
- Example:



## Breaking the Vigenere cipher

- Assume length of key t is known.
- Ciphertext  $C = c_1, c_2, c_3, ...$
- Consider sequences
  - $-c_1, c_{1+t}, c_{1+2t}, \dots$
  - $-c_2, c_{2+t}, c_{2+2t}, \dots$
  - **—** . .
- For each one, run the analysis from before to determine the shift  $k_j$  for each sequence j.


## Index of Coincidence Method

- How to determine the key length?
- Consider the sequence: c<sub>1</sub>, c<sub>1+t</sub> c<sub>1+2t</sub>, ... where t is the true key length
- We expect  $\sum_{i=0}^{25} q_i^2 \approx \sum_{i=0}^{25} p_i^2 \approx 0.065$
- To determine the key length, try different values of  $\tau$  and compute  $S_{\tau} = \sum_{i=0}^{25} q_i^{2}$  for subsequence  $c_1, c_{1+\tau}, c_{1+2\tau}, \dots$
- When  $\tau = t$ , we expect  $S_{\tau}$  to be  $\approx 0.065$
- When  $\tau \neq t$ , we expect that all characters will occur with roughly the same probability so we expect  $S_{\tau}$  to be  $\approx \frac{1}{26} \approx 0.038$ .

#### What have we learned?

- Sufficient key space principle:
  - A secure encryption scheme must have a key space that cannot be searched exhaustively in a reasonable amount of time.
- Designing secure ciphers is a hard task!!
  - All historical ciphers can be completely broken.
- First problem: What does it mean for an encryption scheme to be secure?

#### **Recall our setting**



 $m = Dec_k(c)$ 

After seeing various encryption schemes that are clearly not secure, can we formalize what it means to for a private key encryption scheme to be secure?

First Attempt:

"An encryption scheme is secure if no adversary can find the secret key when given a ciphertext"

Problem: The aim of encryption is to protect the message, not the secret key.

Ex: Consider an encryption scheme that ignores the secret key and outputs the message.

Second Attempt:

"An encryption scheme is secure if no adversary can find the plaintext that corresponds to the ciphertext"

Problem: An encryption scheme that reveals 90% of the plaintext would still be considered secure as long as it is hard to find the remaining 10%.

Third Attempt:

"An encryption scheme is secure if no adversary learns meaningful information about the plaintext after seeing the ciphertext"

How do you formalize learns meaningful information?

#### Coming Up With The Right Definition

How do you formalize learns meaningful information?

Two ways:

- An information-theoretic approach of Shannon (next couple of lectures)
- A computational approach (the approach of modern cryptography)

#### New Topic: Information-Theoretic Security

#### **Probability Background**

## Terminology

- Discrete Random Variable: A discrete random variable is a variable that can take on a value from a finite set of possible different values each with an associated probability.
- Example: Bag with red, blue, yellow marbles. Random variable X describes the outcome of a random draw from the bag. The value of X can be either red, blue or yellow, each with some probability.

## More Terminology

- A discrete probability distribution assigns a probability to each possible outcomes of a discrete random variable.
  - Ex: Bag with red, blue, yellow marbles.
- An experiment or trial (see below) is any procedure that can be infinitely repeated and has a well-defined set of possible outcomes, known as the sample space.

Ex: Drawing a marble at random from the bag.

- An event is a set of outcomes of an experiment (a subset of the sample space) to which a probability is assigned
  - Ex: A red marble is drawn.
  - Ex: A red or yellow marble is drawn.

#### Formally Defining a Symmetric Key Encryption Scheme

#### Syntax

- An encryption scheme is defined by three algorithms
  - Gen, Enc, Dec
- Specification of message space M with |M| > 1.
- Key-generation algorithm *Gen*:
  - Probabilistic algorithm
  - Outputs a key k according to some distribution.
  - Keyspace *K* is the set of all possible keys
- Encryption algorithm *Enc*:
  - Takes as input key  $k \in K$ , message  $m \in M$
  - Encryption algorithm may be probabilistic
  - Outputs ciphertext  $c \leftarrow Enc_k(m)$
  - Ciphertext space C is the set of all possible ciphertexts
- Decryption algorithm *Dec*:
  - Takes as input key  $k \in K$ , ciphertext  $c \in C$
  - Decryption is deterministic
  - Outputs message  $m \coloneqq Dec_k(c)$

## Distributions over K, M, C

- Distribution over **K** is defined by running *Gen* and taking the output.
  - For  $k \in K$ ,  $\Pr[K = k]$  denotes the prob that the key output by *Gen* is equal to k.
- For  $m \in M$ ,  $\Pr[M = m]$  denotes the prob. That the message is equal to m.
  - Models a priori knowledge of adversary about the message.
  - E.g. Message is English text.
- Distributions over *K* and *M* are independent.
- For c ∈ C, Pr[C = c] denotes the probability that the ciphertext is c.
  - Given Enc, distribution over C is fully determined by the distributions over K and M.