

# Solutions

Cryptography--ENEE/CMSC/MATH 456

MAC Class Exercise

Let  $F$  be a length-preserving pseudorandom function. Show that each of the following message authentication codes is insecure. (In each case the shared key is a random  $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ .)

1. To authenticate a message  $m = m_1 || m_2$ , where  $m_1, m_2 \in \{0,1\}^n$ , compute  $t := F_k(m_1) || F_k(m_2 \oplus F_k(m_1))$ .

Attack: query for a signature on  $m_1, m_2$   
get back  $t := t_1 || t_2$  where  $t_1 = F_k(m_1)$   $t_2 = F_k(m_2 \oplus F_k(m_1))$   
query for a signature on  $m_1', m_2'$   
get back  $t' := t'_1 || t'_2$  where  $t'_1 = F_k(m_1')$   $t'_2 = F_k(m_2' \oplus F_k(m_1'))$

Forge a signature on  $m_1'', m_2''$   
where  $m_1'' := m_1$   $m_2'' := t_1 \oplus m_1' = F_k(m_1) \oplus m_1'$   
tag  $t'' := t_1 || t'_1$

2. To authenticate a message  $m = m_1 || \dots || m_\ell$ , where  $m_i \in \{0,1\}^n$ , choose  $r \in \{0,1\}^n$  at random and compute  $t := r || F_k(m_1 \oplus r) || \dots || F_k(m_\ell \oplus r)$ .

Attack: query for a signature on  $m = m_1 || \dots || m_\ell$   
get back  $t := r || t_1 || \dots || t_\ell$

Forge a signature on  $m_1 \oplus r || \dots || m_\ell \oplus r$   
by outputting tag  
 $t' := 0 || t_1 || \dots || t_\ell$